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Abstract. This paper presents a simple local medium access control
protocol, called Jade, for multi-hop wireless networks with a single chan-
nel that is provably robust against adaptive adversarial jamming. The
wireless network is modeled as a unit disk graph on a set of nodes dis-
tributed arbitrarily in the plane. In addition to these nodes, there are
adversarial jammers that know the protocol and its entire history and
that are allowed to jam the wireless channel at any node for an arbi-
trary (1 − ǫ)-fraction of the time steps, where 0 < ǫ < 1 is an arbitrary
constant. We assume that the nodes cannot distinguish between jammed
transmissions and collisions of regular messages. Nevertheless, we show
that Jade achieves an asymptotically optimal throughput if there is a
sufficiently dense distribution of nodes.
1 Introduction
The problem of coordinating the access to a shared medium is a central challenge
in wireless networks. In order to solve this problem, a proper medium access
control (MAC) protocol is needed. Ideally, such a protocol should not only be able
to use the wireless medium as effectively as possible, but it should also be robust
against attacks. Unfortunately, most of the MAC protocols today can be easily
attacked. A particularly critical class of attacks are jamming attacks (i.e., denial-
of-service attacks on the broadcast medium). Jamming attacks are typically easy
to implement as the attacker does not need any special hardware. Attacks of
this kind usually aim at the physical layer and are realized by means of a high
transmission power signal that corrupts a communication link or an area, but
they may also occur at the MAC layer, where an adversary may either corrupt
control packets or reserve the channel for the maximum allowable number of
slots so that other nodes experience low throughput by not being able to access
the channel. In this paper we focus on jamming attacks at the physical layer,
that is, the interference caused by the jammer will not allow the nodes to receive
⋆ A preliminary version of this article appeared at the 24th International Symposium
on Distributed Computing (DISC), 2010.
messages. The fundamental question that we are investigating is: Is there a MAC
protocol such that for any physical-layer jamming strategy, the protocol will still
be able to achieve an asymptotically optimal throughput for the non-jammed time
steps? Such a protocol would force the jammer to jam all the time in order to
prevent any successful message transmissions. Finding such a MAC protocol
is not a trivial problem. In fact, the widely used IEEE 802.11 MAC protocol
already fails to deliver any messages for very simple oblivious jammers that
jam only a small fraction of the time steps [3]. On the positive side, Awerbuch
et al. [2] have demonstrated that there are MAC protocols which are provably
robust against even massive adaptive jamming, but their results only hold for
single-hop wireless networks with a single jammer, that is, all nodes experience
the same jamming sequence.
In this paper, we significantly extend the results in [2]. We present a MAC
protocol called Jade (a short form of “jamming defense”) that can achieve a
constant fraction of the best possible throughput for a large class of jamming
strategies in a large class of multi-hop networks where transmissions and inter-
ference can be modeled using unit-disk graphs. These jamming strategies include
jamming patterns that can be completely different from node to node. It turns
out that while Jade differs only slightly from the MAC protocol of [2], the
proof techniques needed for the multi-hop setting significantly differ from the
techniques in [2].
1.1 Model
We consider the problem of designing a robust MAC protocol for multi-hop
wireless networks with a single wireless channel. The wireless network is modeled
as a unit disk graph (UDG) G = (V,E) where V represents a set of n = |V | honest
and reliable nodes and two nodes u, v ∈ V are within each other’s transmission
range, i.e., {u, v} ∈ E, if and only if their (normalized) distance is at most 1.
We assume that time proceeds in synchronous time steps called rounds. In each
round, a node may either transmit a message or sense the channel, but it cannot
do both. A node which is sensing the channel may either (i) sense an idle channel
(if no other node in its transmission range is transmitting at that round and its
channel is not jammed), (ii) sense a busy channel (if two or more nodes in its
transmission range transmit at that round or its channel is jammed), or (iii)
receive a packet (if exactly one node in its transmission range transmits at that
round and its channel is not jammed).
In addition to these nodes there is an adversary (who may control any number
of jamming devices). We allow the adversary to know the protocol and its entire
history and to use this knowledge in order to jam the wireless channel at will
at any round (i.e, the adversary is adaptive). However, like in [2], the adversary
has to make a jamming decision before it knows the actions of the nodes at the
current round. The adversary can jam the nodes individually at will, as long
as for every node v, at most a (1 − ǫ)-fraction of its rounds is jammed, where
ǫ > 0 can be an arbitrarily small constant. That is, v has the chance to receive
a message in at least an ǫ-fraction of the rounds. More formally, an adversary is
called (T, 1− ǫ)-bounded for some T ∈ N and 0 < ǫ < 1, if for any time window
of size w ≥ T and at any node v, the adversary can jam at most (1− ǫ)w of the
w rounds at v.
Given a node v and a time interval I, we define fv(I) as the number of time
steps in I that are non-jammed at v and sv(I) as the number of time steps in I in
which v successfully receives a message. A MAC protocol is called c-competitive
against some (T, 1− ǫ)-bounded adversary if, for any time interval I with |I| ≥
K for a sufficiently large K (that may depend on T and n),
∑
v∈V sv(I) ≥
c ·
∑
v∈V fv(I). In other words, a c-competitive MAC protocol can achieve at
least a c-fraction of the best possible throughput.
Our goal is to design a symmetric local-control MAC protocol (i.e., there is
no central authority controlling the nodes, and all the nodes are executing the
same protocol) that has a constant-competitive throughput against any (T, 1−ǫ)-
bounded adversary in any multi-hop network that can be modeled as a UDG. In
order to obtain a more refined picture of the competitiveness of our protocol, we
will also investigate so-called k-uniform adversaries. An adversary is k-uniform
if the node set V can be partitioned into k subsets so that the jamming sequence
is the same within each subset. In other words, we require that at all times, the
nodes in a subset are either all jammed or all non-jammed. Thus, a 1-uniform
jammer jams either everybody or nobody in a round whereas an n-uniform
jammer can jam the nodes individually at will.
In this paper, we will say that a claim holds with high probability (w.h.p.) iff
it holds with probability at least 1 − 1/nc for any constant c ≥ 1; it holds with
moderate probability (w.m.p.) iff it holds with probability at least 1− 1/(logn)c
for any constant c ≥ 1.
1.2 Related Work
Due to the topic’s importance, wireless network jamming has been extensively
studied in the applied research fields [1,5,6,22,26,27,28,30,31,37,38,39,40], both
from the attacker’s perspective [6,26,27,40] as well as from the defender’s per-
spective [1,5,6,27,28,30,38,40]—also in multi-hop settings (e.g. [21,32,42,43,44]).
Traditionally, jamming defense mechanisms operate on the physical layer
[28,30,36]. Mechanisms have been designed to avoid jamming as well as detect
jamming. Spread spectrum technology has been shown to be very effective to
avoid jamming as with widely spread signals, it becomes harder to detect the
start of a packet quickly enough in order to jam it. Unfortunately, protocols
such as IEEE 802.11b use relatively narrow spreading [20], and some other IEEE
802.11 variants spread signals by even smaller factors [5]. Therefore, a jammer
that simultaneously blocks a small number of frequencies renders spread spec-
trum techniques useless in this case. As jamming strategies can come in many
different flavors, detecting jamming activities by simple methods based on sig-
nal strength, carrier sensing, or packet delivery ratios has turned out to be quite
difficult [27].
Recent work has also studied MAC layer strategies against jamming, includ-
ing coding strategies [6], channel surfing and spatial retreat [1,41], or mecha-
nisms to hide messages from a jammer, evade its search, and reduce the impact
of corrupted messages [38]. Unfortunately, these methods do not help against
an adaptive jammer with full information about the history of the protocol, like
the one considered in our work.
In the theory community, work on MAC protocols has mostly focused on
efficiency. Many of these protocols are random backoff or tournament-based pro-
tocols [4,7,17,18,25,34] that do not take jamming activity into account and, in
fact, are not robust against it (see [2] for more details). The same also holds for
many MAC protocols that have been designed in the context of broadcasting [8]
and clustering [24]. Also some work on jamming is known (e.g., [9] for a short
overview). There are two basic approaches in the literature. The first assumes
randomly corrupted messages (e.g. [33]), which is much easier to handle than
adaptive adversarial jamming [3]. The second line of work either bounds the
number of messages that the adversary can transmit or disrupt with a limited
energy budget (e.g. [16,23]) or bounds the number of channels the adversary can
jam (e.g. [10,11,12,13,14,15,29]).
The protocols in [16,23] can tackle adversarial jamming at both the MAC
and network layers, where the adversary may not only be jamming the channel
but also introducing malicious (fake) messages (possibly with address spoofing).
However, they depend on the fact that the adversarial jamming budget is finite,
so it is not clear whether the protocols would work under heavy continuous
jamming. (The result in [16] seems to imply that a jamming rate of 1/2 is the
limit whereas the handshaking mechanisms in [23] seem to require an even lower
jamming rate.)
In the multi-channel version of the problem introduced in the theory com-
munity by Dolev [13] and also studied in [10,11,12,13,14,15,29], a node can only
access one channel at a time, which results in protocols with a fairly large run-
time (which can be exponential for deterministic protocols [11,14] and at least
quadratic in the number of jammed channels for randomized protocols [12,29]
if the adversary can jam almost all channels at a time). Recent work [10] also
focuses on the wireless synchronization problem which requires devices to be
activated at different times on a congested single-hop radio network to synchro-
nize their round numbering while an adversary can disrupt a certain number of
frequencies per round. Gilbert et al. [15] study robust information exchange in
single-hop networks.
Our work is motivated by the work in [3] and [2]. In [3] it is shown that an
adaptive jammer can dramatically reduce the throughput of the standard MAC
protocol used in IEEE 802.11 with only limited energy cost on the adversary
side. Awerbuch et al. [2] initiated the study of throughput-competitive MAC
protocols under continuously running, adaptive jammers, but they only consider
single-hop wireless networks. We go one step further by considering multi-hop
networks where different nodes can have different channel states at a time, e.g.,
a transmission may be received only by a fraction of the nodes. It turns out
that while the MAC protocol of [2] can be adopted to the multi-hop setting
with a small modification, the proof techniques cannot. We are not aware of any
other theoretical work on MAC protocols for multi-hop networks with provable
performance against adaptive jamming.
1.3 Our Contributions
In this paper, we present a robust MAC protocol called Jade. Jade is a fairly
simple protocol: it is based on a very small set of assumptions and rules and has
a minimal storage overhead. In fact, in Jade every node just stores a constant
number of parameters, among them a fixed parameter γ that should be chosen
so that the following main theorem holds:
Theorem 1. When running Jade for Ω((T logn)/ǫ+(logn)4/(γǫ)2) time steps,
Jade has a constant competitive throughput for any (T, 1−ǫ)-bounded adversary
and any UDG w.h.p. as long as γ = O(1/(log T+log logn)) and (a) the adversary
is 1-uniform and the UDG is connected, or (b) there are at least 2/ǫ nodes within
the transmission range of every node.
Note that in practice, logT and log log n are rather small so that our condition
on γ is not too restrictive. Also, a conservative estimate on logT and log logn
would leave room for a superpolynomial change in n and a polynomial change
in T over time.
On the other hand, we can also show the following result demonstrating that
Theorem 1 essentially captures all the scenarios (within our notation) under
which Jade can have a constant competitive throughput.
Theorem 2. If (a) the UDG is not connected, or (b) the adversary is allowed
to be 2-uniform and there are nodes with o(1/ǫ) nodes within their transmission
range, then there are cases in which Jade is not constant competitive for any
constant c independent of ǫ.
Certainly, no MAC protocol can guarantee a constant competitive through-
put if the UDG is not connected. However, it is still open whether there are
simple MAC protocols that are constant competitive under non-uniform jam-
ming strategies even if there are o(1/ǫ) nodes within the transmission range of
a node.
2 Description of Jade
This section first gives a short motivation for our algorithmic approach and then
presents the Jade protocol in detail.
2.1 Intuition
The intuition behind our MAC protocol is simple: in each round, each node u
tries to send a message with probability pu with pu ≤ pˆ for some small con-
stant 0 < pˆ < 1. Consider the unit disk D(u) around node u consisting of
u’s neighboring nodes as well as u.1 Moreover, let N(u) = D(u) \ {u} and
p =
∑
v∈N(u) pv. Suppose that u is sensing the channel. Let q0 be the proba-
bility that the channel is idle at u and let q1 be the probability that exactly
one node in N(u) is sending a message. It holds that q0 =
∏
v∈N(u)(1− pv) and
q1 =
∑
v∈N(u) pv
∏
w∈N(u)\{v}(1− pw). Hence,
q1 ≤
∑
v∈N(u)
pv
1
1− pˆ
∏
w∈N(u)
(1−pw) =
q0 · p
1− pˆ
, q1 ≥
∑
v∈N(u)
pv
∏
w∈N(u)
(1−pw) = q0·p.
Thus we have the following lemma, which has also been derived in [2] for the
single-hop case.
Lemma 1. q0 · p ≤ q1 ≤
q0
1−pˆ · p.
By Lemma 1, if a node v observes that the number of rounds in which the
channel is idle is essentially equal to the number of rounds in which exactly one
message is sent, then p =
∑
v∈N(v) pv is likely to be around 1 (if pˆ is a sufficiently
small constant), which would be ideal. Otherwise, the nodes know that they need
to adapt their probabilities. Thus, if we had sufficiently many cases in which an
idle channel or exactly one message transmission is observed (which is the case if
the adversary does not heavily jam the channel and p is not too large), then one
can adapt the probabilities pv just based on these two events and ignore all cases
in which the wireless channel is blocked, either because the adversary is jamming
it or because at least two messages interfere with each other (see also [19] for
a similar conclusion). Unfortunately, p can be very high for some reason, which
requires a more sophisticated strategy for adjusting the access probabilities.
2.2 Protocol Description
In Jade, each node v maintains a probability value pv, a threshold Tv and a
counter cv. The parameters pˆ, γ > 0 in the protocol are fixed and the same for
every node. pˆ may be set to any constant value so that 0 < pˆ ≤ 1/24, and γ
should be small enough so that the condition in Theorem 1 is met.
Initially, every node v sets Tv := 1, cv := 1 and pv := pˆ. Afterwards, the Jade
protocol works in synchronized rounds. In every round, each node v decides with
probability pv to send a message. If it decides not to send a message, it checks
the following two conditions:
– If v senses an idle channel, then pv := min{(1 + γ)pv, pˆ}.
– If v successfully receives a message, then pv := (1 + γ)
−1pv and Tv :=
max{Tv − 1, 1}.
1 In this paper, disks (and later sectors) will refer both to 2-dimensional areas in the
plane as well as to the set of nodes in the respective areas. The exact meaning will
become clear in the specific context.
Afterwards, v sets cv := cv + 1. If cv > Tv then it does the following: v sets
cv := 1, and if there was no round among the past Tv rounds in which v sensed a
successful message transmission or an idle channel, then pv := (1 + γ)
−1pv and
Tv := min{Tv + 1, 21/(4γ)} .
As we will see in the upcoming section, the concept of using a multiplicative-
increase-multiplicative-decrease mechanism for pv and an additive-increase-
additive-decrease mechanism for Tv, as well as the slight modifications of the
protocol in [2], marked in italic above, are crucial for Jade to work.
3 Analysis of Jade
In contrast the description of Jade, its stochastic analysis is rather involved as it
requires to shed light onto the complex interplay of the nodes all following their
randomized protocol in a highly dependent manner. We first prove Theorem 1
(Sections 3.1 and 3.2) and then prove Theorem 2 (Section 3.3). In order to show
the theorems, we will frequently use the following variant of the Chernoff bounds
[2,35].
Lemma 2. Consider any set of binary random variables X1, . . . , Xn. Suppose
that there are values p1, . . . , pn ∈ [0, 1] with E[
∏
i∈S Xi] ≤
∏
i∈S pi for every set
S ⊆ {1, . . . , n}. Then it holds for X =
∑n
i=1Xi and µ =
∑n
i=1 pi and any δ > 0
that
P[X ≥ (1 + δ)µ] ≤
(
eδ
(1 + δ)1+δ
)µ
≤ e−
δ2µ
2(1+δ/3) .
If, on the other hand, it holds that E[
∏
i∈S Xi] ≥
∏
i∈S pi for every set S ⊆
{1, . . . , n}, then it holds for any 0 < δ < 1 that
P[X ≤ (1− δ)µ] ≤
(
e−δ
(1 − δ)1−δ
)µ
≤ e−δ
2µ/2.
Throughout the section we assume that γ = O(1/(logT + log logn)) is suffi-
ciently small.
3.1 Proof of Theorem 1
We first look at a slightly weaker form of adversary. We say a round t is open for
a node v if v and at least one other node in its neighborhood are non-jammed
(which implies that v’s neighborhood is non-empty). An adversary is weakly
(T, 1 − ǫ)-bounded for some T ∈ N and 0 < ǫ < 1 if the adversary is (T, 1 − ǫ)-
bounded and in addition to this, at least a constant fraction of the non-jammed
rounds at each node are open in every time interval of size w ≥ T .
Theorem 3. When running Jade for Ω([T +(log3 n)/(γ2ǫ)] · (logn)/ǫ) rounds
it holds w.h.p. that Jade is constant competitive for any weakly (T, 1−ǫ)-bounded
adversary.
Proof. First, we focus on a time frame F consisting of (α logn)/ǫ subframes
of size f = α[T + (log3 n)/(γ2ǫ)] each, where f is a multiple of T and α is a
sufficiently large constant. The proof needs the following three lemmas. The first
one is identical to Claim 2.5 in [2]. It is true because only successful message
transmissions reduce Tu.
Lemma 3. If in a time interval I the number of rounds in which a node u
successfully receives a message is at most r, then u increases Tu in at most
r +
√
2|I| rounds in I.
The second lemma holds for arbitrary (not just weakly) (T, 1 − ǫ)-bounded
adversaries and will be shown in Section 3.2.
Lemma 4. For every node u,
∑
v∈D(u) pv = O(1) for at least a (1−ǫβ)-fraction
of the rounds in time frame F , w.h.p., where the constant β > 0 can be made
arbitrarily small.
The third lemma just follows from some simple geometric argument.
Lemma 5. A disk of radius 2 can be cut into at most 20 regions so that the
distance between any two points in a region is at most 1.
Consider some fixed node u. Let J ⊆ F be the set of all non-jammed open
rounds at u in time frame F (which are a constant fraction of the non-jammed
rounds at u because we have a weakly (T, 1 − ǫ)-bounded adversary). Let p be
a constant satisfying Lemma 4 (i.e.,
∑
w∈D(v) pw ≤ p). Define DD(u) to be the
disk of radius 2 around u (i.e., it has twice the radius of D(u)). Cut DD(u)
into 20 regions R1, . . . , R20 satisfying Lemma 5, and let vi be any node in region
Ri (if such a node exists), where vi = u if u ∈ Ri. According to Lemma 4 it
holds for each i that at least a (1 − ǫβ′/20)-fraction of the rounds in F satisfy∑
w∈D(vi)
pw ≤ p for any constant β′ > 0, w.h.p. Thus, at least a (1 − ǫβ′′)-
fraction of the rounds in F satisfy
∑
w∈D(vi)
pw ≤ p for every i for any constant
β′′ > 0, w.h.p. As D(v) ⊆ DD(u) for all v ∈ D(u) and u has at least ǫ|F | non-
jammed rounds in F , we get the following lemma, which also holds for arbitrary
(T, 1− ǫ)-bounded adversaries
Lemma 6. At least a (1−β)-fraction of the rounds in J satisfy
∑
v∈D(u) pv ≤ p
and
∑
w∈D(v) pw = O(p) for all nodes v ∈ D(u) for any constant β > 0, w.h.p.
Let us call these rounds good. Since the probability that u senses the channel
is at least 1−pˆ and the probability that the channel at u is idle for
∑
w∈D(u) pw ≤
p is equal to
∏
v∈N(u)(1− pv) ≥
∏
v∈N(u) e
−2pv ≥ e−2p, u senses an idle channel
for at least (1− pˆ)(1−β)|J |e−2p ≥ 2β|J | many rounds in J on expectation if β is
sufficiently small. This also holds w.h.p. when using the Chernoff bounds under
the condition that at least (1 − β)|J | rounds in F are good (which also holds
w.h.p.). Let k be the number of times u receives a message in F . We distinguish
between two cases.
Case 1: k ≥ β|J |/6. Then Jade is constant competitive for u and we are done.
Case 2: k < β|J |/6. Then we know from Lemma 3 that pu is decreased at most
β|J |/6 +
√
2|F | times in F due to cu > Tu. In addition to this, pu is decreased
at most β|J |/6 times in F due to a received message. On the other hand, pu
is increased at least 2β|J | times in J (if possible) due to an idle channel w.h.p.
Also, we know from the Jade protocol that at the beginning of F , pu = pˆ.
Hence, there must be at least β(2 − 1/6− 1/6)|J | −
√
2|F | ≥ (3/2)β|J | rounds
in J w.h.p. at which pu = pˆ. As there are at least (1 − β)|J | good rounds in
J (w.h.p.), there are at least β|J |/2 good rounds in J w.h.p. in which pu = pˆ.
For these good rounds, u has a constant probability to transmit a message and
every node v ∈ D(u) has a constant probability of receiving it, so u successfully
transmits Θ(|J |) messages to at least one of its non-jammed neighbors in F (on
expectation and also w.h.p.).
If we charge 1/2 of each successfully transmitted message to the sender and
1/2 to the receiver, then a constant competitive throughput can be identified for
every node in both cases above, so Jade is constant competitive in F .
It remains to show that Theorem 3 also holds for larger time intervals than
|F |. First, note that all the proofs are valid as long as γ ≤ 1/[c(logT +log logn)]
for a constant c ≥ 2, so we can increase T and thereby also |F | as long as this
inequality holds. So w.l.o.g. we may assume that γ = 1/[2(logT + log logn)].
In this case, 21/(4γ) ≤
√
|F |, so our rule of increasing Tv in Jade implies that
Tv ≤
√
|F | at any time. This allows us to extend the competitive throughput
result from a single to any sequence of polynomial in n many time frames F ,
which completes the proof of Theorem 3. ⊓⊔
Now, let us consider the two cases of Theorem 1. Recall that we allow here
any (T, 1− ǫ)-bounded adversary and not just a weakly bounded.
Case 1: the adversary is 1-uniform and the UDG is connected. In this
case, every node has a non-empty neighborhood and therefore all non-jammed
rounds of the nodes are open. Hence, the conditions on a weakly (T, 1 − ǫ)-
bounded adversary are satisfied. So Theorem 3 applies, which completes the
proof of Theorem 1 a).
Case 2: |D(v)| ≥ 2/ǫ for all v ∈ V . Consider some fixed time interval I
with |I| being a multiple of T . For every node v ∈ D(u) let fv be the number
of non-jammed rounds at v in I and ov be the number of open rounds at v in
I. Let J be the set of rounds in I with at most one non-jammed node. Suppose
that |J | > (1− ǫ/2)|I|. Then every node in D(u) must have more than (ǫ/2)|I|
of its non-jammed rounds in J . As these non-jammed rounds must be serialized
in J to satisfy our requirement on J , it holds that |J | >
∑
v∈D(u)(ǫ/2)|I| ≥
(2/ǫ) · (ǫ/2)|I| = |I|. Since this is impossible, it must hold that |J | ≤ (1− ǫ/2)|I|.
Thus,
∑
v∈D(u) ov ≥ (
∑
v∈D(u) fv) − |J | ≥ (1/2)
∑
v∈D(u) fv because∑
v∈D(u) fv ≥ (2/ǫ) · ǫ|I| = 2|I|. Let D
′(u) be the set of nodes v ∈ D(u)
with ov ≥ fv/4. That is, for each of these nodes, a constant fraction of the
non-jammed time steps is open. Then
∑
v∈D(u)\D′(u) ov < (1/4)
∑
v∈D(u) fv, so∑
v∈D′(u) ov ≥ (1/2)
∑
v∈D(u) ov ≥ (1/4)
∑
v∈D(u) fv.
Consider now a set U ⊆ V of nodes so that
⋃
u∈U D(u) = V and for every
v ∈ V there are at most 6 nodes u ∈ U with v ∈ D(u) (U is easy to construct
in a greedy fashion for arbitrary UDGs and also known as a dominating set of
constant density). Let V ′ =
⋃
u∈U D
′(u). Since
∑
v∈D′(u) ov ≥ (1/4)
∑
v∈D(u) fv
for every node u ∈ U , it follows that
∑
v∈V ′ ov ≥ (1/6)
∑
u∈U
∑
v∈D′(u) ov ≥
(1/24)
∑
u∈U
∑
v∈D(u) fv ≥ (1/24)
∑
v∈V fv. Using that together with Theo-
rem 3, which implies that Jade is constant competitive w.r.t. the nodes in V ′,
completes the proof of Theorem 1 b).
3.2 Proof of Lemma 4
In order to finish the proof of Theorem 1, it remains to prove Lemma 4. Consider
any fixed node u. We partition u’s unit disk D(u) into six sectors of equal angles
from u, S1, ..., S6. Note that all nodes within a sector Si have distances of at
most 1 from each other, so they can directly communicate with each other (in
D(u), distances can be up to 2). We will first explore properties of an arbitrary
node in one sector, then consider the implications for a whole sector, and finally
bound the cumulative sending probability in the entire unit disk.
Recall the definition of a time frame, a subframe and f in the proof of The-
orem 3. Fix a sector S in D(u) and consider some fixed time frame F . Let us
refer to the sum of the probabilities of the neighboring nodes of a given node
v ∈ S by p¯v :=
∑
w∈S\{v} pw. The following lemma shows that pv will decrease
dramatically if p¯v is high throughout a certain time interval.
Lemma 7. Consider a node v in a unit disk D(u). If p¯v > 5 − pˆ during all
rounds of a subframe I of F , then pv will be at most 1/n
2 at the end of I, w.h.p.
Proof. We say that a round is useful for node v if from v’s perspective there is an
idle channel or a successful transmission at that round (when ignoring the action
of v); otherwise the round is called non-useful. Note that in a non-useful round,
according to our protocol, pv will either decrease (if the threshold Tv is exceeded)
or remain the same. On the other hand, in a useful round, pv will increase (if v
senses an idle channel), decrease (if v senses a successful transmission) or remain
the same (if v sends a message). Hence, pv can only increase during useful rounds
of I. Let U be the set of useful rounds in I for our node v. We distinguish between
two cases, depending on the cardinality |U|. In the following, let pv(0) denote
the probability of v at the beginning of I (which is at most pˆ). Suppose that
f ≥ 2[(3c lnn)/γ]2 for a sufficiently large constant c. (This lower bound coincides
with our definition of f in the proof of Theorem 3.)
Case 1: Suppose that |U| < (c lnn)/γ, that is, many rounds are blocked and
pv can increase only rarely. As there are at least (3c lnn)/γ occasions in I in
which cv > Tv and |U| < (c lnn)/γ, in at least (2c lnn)/γ of these occasions v
only saw blocked channels for Tv consecutive rounds and therefore decides to
increase Tv and decrease pv. Hence, at the end of I,
pv ≤ (1 + γ)
|U|−2c lnn/γpv(0) ≤ (1 + γ)
−c lnn/γpv(0) ≤ e
−c lnn = 1/nc.
Case 2: Next, suppose that |U| ≥ (c lnn)/γ. We will show that many of these
useful rounds will be successful such that pv decreases. Since pv ≤ pˆ ≤ 1/24
throughout I, it follows from the Chernoff bounds that w.h.p. v will sense the
channel for at least a fraction of 2/3 of the useful rounds w.h.p. Let this set of
useful rounds be called U ′. Consider any round t ∈ U ′. Let q0 be the probability
that there is an idle channel at round t and q1 be the probability that there
is a successful transmission at t. It holds that q0 + q1 = 1. From Lemma 1 we
also know that q1 ≥ q0 · p¯v. Since p¯v > 5 − pˆ for all rounds in I, it follows that
q1 ≥ 4/5 for every round in U ′. Thus, it follows from the Chernoff bounds that
for at least 2/3 of the rounds in U ′, v will sense a successful transmission w.h.p.
Hence, at the end of I it holds w.h.p. that
pv ≤ (1 + γ)
−(1/3)·|U ′|pv(0) ≤ (1 + γ)
−(1/3)·(2c/3) lnn/γpv(0) ≤ e
−(2c/9) lnn = 1/n2c/9.
Combining the two cases with c ≥ 9 results in the lemma. ⊓⊔
Given this property of the individual probabilities, we can derive a bound
for the cumulative probability of an entire sector S. In order to compute pS =∑
v∈S pv, we introduce three thresholds, a low one, ρgreen = 5, one in the middle,
ρyellow = 5e, and a high one, ρred = 5e
2. The following three lemmas provide
some important insights about these probabilities.
Lemma 8. For any subframe I in F and any initial value of pS in I there is at
least one round in I with pS ≤ ρgreen w.h.p.
Proof. We prove the lemma by contradiction. Suppose that throughout the entire
interval I, pS > ρgreen. Then it holds for every node v ∈ S that p¯v > ρgreen − pˆ
throughout I. In this case, however, we know from Lemma 7, that pv will decrease
to at most 1/n2 at the end of I w.h.p. Hence, all nodes v ∈ S would decrease
pv to at most 1/n
2 at the end of I w.h.p., which results in pS ≤ 1/n. This
contradicts our assumption, so w.h.p. there must be a round t in I at which
pS ≤ ρgreen. ⊓⊔
Lemma 9. For any time interval I in F of size f and any sector S it holds
that if pS ≤ ρgreen at the beginning of I, then pS ≤ ρyellow throughout I, w.m.p.
Similarly, if pS ≤ ρyellow at the beginning of I, then pS ≤ ρred throughout I,
w.m.p.
Proof. It suffices to prove the lemma for the case that initially pS ≤ ρgreen
as the other case is analogous. Consider some fixed round t in I. Let pS be the
cumulative probability at the beginning of t and p′S be the cumulative probability
at the end of t. Moreover, let p
(0)
S denote the cumulative probability of the nodes
w ∈ S with no transmitting node in D(w)\S in round t. Similarly, let p
(1)
S denote
the cumulative probability of the nodes w ∈ S with a single transmitting node
in D(w) \ S, and let p
(2)
S be the cumulative probability of the nodes w ∈ S that
experience a blocked round either because they are jammed or at least two nodes
in D(w) \ S are transmitting at t. Certainly, pS = p
(0)
S + p
(1)
S + p
(2)
S . Our goal
is to determine p′S in this case. Let q0(S) be the probability that all nodes in S
stay silent, q1(S) be the probability that exactly one node in S is transmitting,
and q2(S) = 1 − q0(S) − q1(S) be the probability that at least two nodes in S
are transmitting.
When ignoring the case that cv > Tv for a node v ∈ S at round t, it holds:
E[p′S ] = q0(S) · [(1 + γ)p
(0)
S + (1 + γ)
−1p
(1)
S + p
(2)
S ]
+q1(S) · [(1 + γ)
−1p
(0)
S + p
(1)
S + p
(2)
S ]
+q2(S) · [p
(0)
S + p
(1)
S + p
(2)
S ]
This is certainly also an upper bound for E[p′S ] if cv > Tv for a node v ∈ S
because pv will never be increased (but possibly decreased) in this case. Now,
consider the event E2 that at least two nodes in S transmit a message. If E2
holds, then E[p′S ] = p
′
S = pS , so there is no change in the system. On the other
hand, assume that E2 does not hold. Let q
′
0(S) = q0(S)/(1− q2(S)) and q
′
1(S) =
q1(S)/(1 − q2(S)) be the probabilities q0(S) and q1(S) under the condition of
¬E2. Then we distinguish between three cases.
Case 1: p
(0)
S = pS . Then
E[p′S ] ≤ q
′
0(S) · (1 + γ)pS + q
′
1(S) · (1 + γ)
−1pS
= ((1 + γ)q′0(S) + (1 + γ)
−1q′1(S))pS .
From Lemma 1 we know that q0(S) ≤ q1(S)/pS , so q′0(S) ≤ q
′
1(S)/pS . If pS ≥
ρgreen, then q
′
0(S) ≤ q
′
1(S)/5. Hence,
E[p′S ] ≤ ((1 + γ)/6 + (1 + γ)
−15/6)pS ≤ (1 + γ)
−1/2pS
since γ = o(1). On the other hand, p′S ≤ (1 + γ)pS in any case.
Case 2: p
(1)
S = pS . Then
E[p′S ] ≤ q
′
0(S) · (1 + γ)
−1pS + q
′
1(S)pS
= (q′0(S)/(1 + γ) + (1− q
′
0(S)))pS = (1− q
′
0(S)γ/(1 + γ))pS .
Now, it holds that 1 − xγ/(1 + γ) ≤ (1 + γ)−x/2 for all x ∈ [0, 1] because from
the Taylor series of ex and ln(1 + x) it follows that
(1 + γ)−x/2 ≥ 1− (x ln(1 + γ))/2 ≥ 1− (x(1 − γ/2)γ)/2
and
1− xγ/(1 + γ) ≤ 1− (x(1 − γ/2)γ)/2
for all x, γ ∈ [0, 1] as is easy to check. Therefore, when defining ϕ = q′0(S), we
get E[p′S ] ≤ (1 + γ)
−ϕ/2pS . On the other hand, p
′
S ≤ pS ≤ (1 + γ)
ϕpS .
Case 3: p
(2)
S = pS . Then for ϕ = 0, E[p
′
S ] ≤ pS = (1 + γ)
−ϕ/2pS and p
′
S ≤ pS =
(1 + γ)ϕpS .
Combining the three cases and taking into account that p
(0)
S +p
(1)
S +p
(2)
S = pS ,
we obtain the following result.
Lemma 10. There is a φ ∈ [0, 1] (depending on p
(0)
S , p
(1)
S and p
(2)
S ) so that
E[p′S ] ≤ (1 + γ)
−φpS and p
′
S ≤ (1 + γ)
2φpS . (1)
Proof. Let a = (1 + γ)1/2, b = (1 + γ)ϕ/2 for the ϕ defined in Case 2, and
c = 1. Furthermore, let x0 = p
(0)
S /pS , x1 = p
(1)
S /pS and x2 = p
(2)
S /pS . Define
φ = − log1+γ((1/a)x0 + (1/b)x1 + (1/c)x2). Then we have
E[p′S ] ≤ (1 + γ)
−1/2p
(0)
S + (1 + γ)
−ϕ/2p
(1)
S + p
(2)
S = (1 + γ)
−φpS .
We need to show that for this φ, also p′S ≤ (1 + γ)
2φpS . As p
′
S ≤ (1 + γ)p
(0)
S +
(1 + γ)ϕp
(1)
S + p
(2)
S , this is true if
a2x0 + b
2x1 + c
2x2 ≤
1
((1/a)x0 + (1/b)x1 + (1/c)x2)2
or
((1/a)x0 + (1/b)x1 + (1/c)x2)
2(a2x0 + b
2x1 + c
2x2) ≤ 1 (2)
To prove this, we need two claims whose proofs are tedious but follow from
standard math.
Claim. For any a, b, c > 0 and any x0, x1, x2 > 0 with x0 + x1 + x2 = 1,
(ax0 + bx1 + cx2)
2 ≤ (a2x0 + b
2x1 + c
2x2)
Claim. For any a, b, c > 0 and any x0, x1, x2 > 0 with x0 + x1 + x2 = 1,
((1/a)x0 + (1/b)x1 + (1/c)x2)(ax0 + bx1 + cx2) ≤ 1
Combining the claims, Equation 2 follows, which completes the proof. ⊓⊔
Hence, for any outcome of E2, E[p
′
S ] ≤ (1+γ)
−ϕpS and p
′
S ≤ (1+γ)
2ϕpS for
some ϕ ∈ [0, 1]. If we define qS = log1+γ pS , then it holds that E[q
′
S ] ≤ qS − ϕ.
For any time t in I, let qt be equal to qS at time t and ϕt be defined as ϕ
at time t. Our calculations above imply that as long as pS ∈ [ρgreen, ρyellow],
E[qt+1] ≤ qt − ϕt and qt+1 ≤ qt + 2ϕt.
Now, suppose that within subframe I we reach a point t when pS > ρyellow.
Since we start with pS ≤ ρgreen, there must be a time interval I ′ ⊆ I so that
right before I ′, pS ≤ ρgreen, during I
′ we always have ρgreen < pS ≤ ρyellow,
and at the end of I ′, pS > ρyellow . We want to bound the probability for this to
happen.
Consider some fixed interval I ′ with the properties above, i.e., with pS ≤
ρgreen right before I
′ and pS ≥ ρgreen at the first round of I ′, so initially,
pS ∈ [ρgreen, (1 + γ)ρgreen]. We use martingale theory to bound the probability
that in this case, the properties defined above for I ′ hold. Consider the rounds
in I ′ to be numbered from 1 to |I ′|, let qt and ϕt be defined as above, and let
q′t = qt +
∑t−1
i=1 ϕi. It holds that
E[q′t+1] = E[qt+1 +
t∑
i=1
ϕi] = E[qt+1] +
t∑
i=1
ϕi ≤ qt − ϕt +
t∑
i=1
ϕi = qt +
t−1∑
i=1
ϕi = q
′
t.
Moreover, it follows from Inequality (1) that for any round t, p′S ≤ (1+γ)
2ϕtpS .
Therefore, qt+1 ≤ qt+2ϕt, which implies that q′t+1 ≤ q
′
t+ϕt. Hence, we can define
a martingale (Xt)t∈I′ with E[Xt+1] = Xt and Xt+1 ≤ Xt + ϕt that stochasti-
cally dominates q′t. Recall that a random variable Yt stochastically dominates a
random variable Zt if for any z, P[Yt ≥ z] ≥ P[Zt ≥ z]. In that case, it is also
straightforward to show that
∑
i Yi stochastically dominates
∑
i Zi, which we
will need in the following. Let T = |I ′|. We will make use of Azuma’s inequality
to bound XT .
Fact 4 (Azuma Inequality) Let X0, X1, . . . be a martingale satisfying the
property that Xi ≤ Xi−1 + ci for all i ≥ 1. Then for any δ ≥ 0,
P[XT > X0 + δ] ≤ e
−δ2/(2
∑T
i=1 c
2
i ).
Thus, for δ = 1/γ +
∑T
i=1 ϕi it holds in our case that
P[XT > X0 + δ] ≤ e
−δ2/(2
∑T
i=1 ϕ
2
i ).
This implies that
P[q′T > q
′
0 + δ] ≤ e
−δ2/(2
∑T
i=1 ϕ
2
i ),
for several reasons. First of all, stochastic dominance holds as long as pS ∈
[ρgreen, ρyellow ], and whenever this is violated, we can stop the process as the
requirements on I ′ would be violated, so we would not have to count that prob-
ability towards I ′. Therefore,
P[qT > q0 + 1/γ] ≤ e
−δ2/(2
∑T
i=1 ϕ
2
i ).
Notice that qT > q0 + 1/γ is required so that pS > ρyellow at the end of I
′, so
the probability bound above is exactly what we need. Let ϕ =
∑T
i=1 ϕi. Since
ϕi ≤ 1 for all i, ϕ ≥
∑T
i=1 ϕ
2
i . Hence,
δ2
2
∑T
i=1 ϕ
2
i
≥
(1/γ + ϕ)2
2ϕ
≥
(
1
2ϕγ2
+
ϕ
2
)
.
This is minimized for 1/(2ϕγ2) = ϕ/2 or equivalently, ϕ = 1/γ. Thus,
P[qT > q0 + 1/γ] ≤ e
−1/γ
Since there are at most
(
f
2
)
ways of selecting I ′ ⊆ I, the probability that there
exists an interval I ′ with the properties above is at most
(
f
2
)
e−1/γ ≤ f2e−1/γ ≤
1
logc n
for any constant c if γ = O(1/(logT + log logn)) is small enough. ⊓⊔
Lemma 11. For any subframe I in F it holds that if there has been at least one
round during the past subframe where pS ≤ ρgreen, then throughout I, pS ≤ ρred
w.m.p.
Proof. Suppose that there has been at least one round during the past subframe
where pS ≤ ρgreen. Then we know from Lemma 9 that w.m.p. pS ≤ ρyellow at
the beginning of I. But if pS ≤ ρyellow at the beginning of I, we also know from
Lemma 9 that w.m.p. pS ≤ ρred throughout I, which proves the lemma. ⊓⊔
Now, define a subframe I to be good if pS ≤ ρred throughout I, and otherwise
I is called bad. With the help of Lemma 8 and Lemma 11 we can prove the
following lemma.
Lemma 12. For any sector S, at most ǫβ/6 of the subframes I in F are bad
w.h.p., where the constant β > 0 can be made arbitrarily small depending on the
constant α in f .
Proof. From Lemma 8 it follows that for every subframe I in F there is a time
point t ∈ I at which pS ≤ ρgreen w.h.p. Consider now some fixed subframe I in
F that is not the first one and suppose that the previous subframe in F had at
least one round with pS ≤ ρgreen. Then it follows from Lemma 11 that for all
rounds in I, pS ≤ ρred w.m.p. (where the probability only depends on I and its
preceding subframe), i.e., I is good. Hence, it follows from the Chernoff bounds
that at most ǫβ/7 of the odd-numbered as well as the even-numbered subframes
after the first subframe in F are bad w.h.p. (if the constant α is sufficiently
large). This implies that overall at most ǫβ/6 of the subframes in F are bad
w.h.p. ⊓⊔
From Lemma 12 it follows that apart from an ǫβ-fraction of the subframes,
all subframes I in F satisfy
∑
v∈D(u) pv ∈ O(1) throughout I, which completes
the proof of Lemma 4.
3.3 Limitations of the Jade Protocol
One may ask whether a stronger throughput result than Theorem 1 can be
shown. Ideally, we would like to use the following model. A MAC protocol is
called strongly c-competitive against some (T, 1−ǫ)-bounded adversary if, for any
sufficiently large time interval and any node v, the number of rounds in which v
successfully receives a message is at least a c-fraction of the total number of non-
jammed rounds at v. In other words, a strongly c-competitive MAC protocol can
achieve at least a c-fraction of the best possible throughput for every individual
node. Unfortunately, such a protocol seems to be difficult to design. In fact, Jade
is not strongly c-competitive for any constant c > 0, even if the node density is
sufficiently high.
Theorem 5. In general, Jade is not strongly c-competitive for a constant c > 0
if the adversary is allowed to be 2-uniform and ǫ ≤ 1/3.
Proof. Suppose that (at some corner of the UDG) we have a set U of at least 1/pˆ
nodes located closely to each other that are all within the transmission range
of a node v. Initially, we assume that
∑
u∈U pu ≥ 1, pv = pˆ and Tx = 1 for
all nodes x ∈ U ∪ {v}. The time is partitioned into time intervals of size T . In
each such time interval, called T -interval, the (T, 1− ǫ)-bounded adversary jams
all but the first ǫT rounds at U and all but the last ǫT rounds at v. It follows
directly from Section 2.3 of [2] that if T = Ω((log3 n)/(γ2ǫ)), then for every node
u ∈ U , Tu ≤ α
√
T logn/ǫ w.h.p. for some sufficiently large constant α. Thus,
Tu ≤ γT/(β logn) w.h.p. for any constant β > 0 if T is sufficiently large. Hence,
between the last non-jammed round at U and the first non-jammed round at v
in a T -interval, the values Tu are increased (and the values pu are decreased) at
least β(log n)/(6γ) times. Thus, at the first non-jammed round at v, it holds for
every u ∈ U that
pu ≤ pˆ · (1 + γ)
−β(logn)/(6γ) ≤ pˆ · e−(β/6) logn ≤ 1/nβ/6
and, therefore,
∑
u∈U pu = O(1/n
2) if β ≥ 18. This cumulative probability will
stay that low during all of v’s non-jammed rounds as during these rounds the
nodes in U are jammed. Hence, the probability that v receives any message
during its non-jammed rounds of a T -interval is O(1/n2), so Jade is not c-
competitive for v for any constant c > 0. ⊓⊔
Also, in our original model, Jade is not constant competitive if the node
density is too low.
Theorem 6. In general, Jade is not c-competitive for a constant c independent
of ǫ if there are nodes u with |D(u)| = o(1/ǫ) and the adversary is allowed to be
2-uniform.
Proof. Suppose that we have a set U of k = o(1/ǫ) nodes located closely to
each other that are all within the transmission range of a node v. Let T =
Ω((log3 n)/(γ2ǫ)). In each T -interval, the adversary never jams v but jams all
but the first ǫT rounds at U . Then Section 2.3 of [2] implies that for every node
u ∈ U , Tu ≤ γT/(β log n) w.h.p. for any constant β > 0 if T is sufficiently large.
The nodes in U continuously increase their Tu-values and thereby reduce their pu
values during their jammed time steps. Hence, the nodes in U ∪ {v} will receive
200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400 1600 1800
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Network Size
T
h
ro
u
g
h
p
u
t
Uniform distribution
Gauss distribution
Fig. 1. Top: Throughput as a function of network size. Bottom left: Convergence
behavior for multi-hop networks (uniform distribution). For the plot, we used
n = 500. Note that the start-up phase where the sending probabilities are high is
short (no more than 50 rounds). Bottom right: Convergence of Tv for multi-hop
networks (uniform distribution). For the plot, we used n = 500.
at most ǫT · |U | + (ǫT + O(T/ logn)) = ǫT · o(1/ǫ) + (ǫ + o(1))T = (ǫ + o(1))T
messages in each T -interval on expectation whereas the sum of non-jammed
rounds over all nodes is more than T . ⊓⊔
This implies Theorem 2. Hence, Theorem 1 is essentially the best one can
show for Jade (within our notation).
3.4 Simulations
In order to complement our theoretical insights, we conducted some experiments.
First, we present our throughput results for a sufficiently large time interval, and
then we discuss the convergence behavior. For our simulations, as in our formal
analysis, we assume that initially all nodes v ∈ V have a high sending probability
of pv = pˆ = 1/24. The nodes are distributed at random over a square plane of
4 × 4 units, and are connected in a unit disk graph manner (multi-hop). We
simulate the jamming activity in the following way: for each round, a node is
jammed independently with probability (1 − ǫ). We run the simulation for a
sufficiently large number of time steps indicated by the Theorem 1, i.e., for
([T + (log3 n)/(γ2ǫ)] · (log n)/ǫ rounds, where ǫ = 0.3, T = 200, and γ = 0.1.
Figure 1 (top) shows the throughput competitiveness of Jade for a sce-
nario where different numbers of nodes are distributed uniformly at random
over the plane and a scenario where the nodes are distributed according to a
normal/Gaussian distribution N (0, 1). In both cases, the throughput is larger
when the density is higher. This corresponds to our formal insight that a con-
stant competitive throughput is possible only if the node density exceeds a cer-
tain threshold. For example, this holds in case there are 60 nodes in the 4 × 4
plane (density of 3.75), as there are at least 3.75π ≈ 12 > 2/ǫ ≈ 7 uniformly
distributed nodes in one unit disk. As can be seen in the figure, when the number
of nodes is larger than 60, the throughput falls in a range between 20% and 35%.
Convergence time is the second most important evaluation criterion. We
found that already after a short time, a constant throughput is achieved; in
particular, the total sending probability per unit disk approaches a constant
value quickly. This is due to the nodes’ ability to adapt their sending probabili-
ties fast, see Figure 1 (bottom left). The figure also illustrates the high correlation
between success ratio and aggregated sending probability.
Finally, we have also studied the average of the Tv values over time. While
initially, due to the high sending probabilities, the Tv intervals are large (up to
around 5 if n = 500), they decline quickly, similarly to our observations made
in the previous plots. The average of Tv values stabilize in an interval [2, 4], as
shown in Figure 1 (bottom right).
4 Conclusion
This paper has presented the first jamming-resistant MAC protocol with prov-
ably good performance in multi-hop networks exposed to an adaptive adversary.
While we have focused on unit disk graphs, we believe that our stochastic anal-
ysis is also useful for more realistic wireless network models. Moreover, although
our analysis is involved, our protocol is rather simple.
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